30 [First Essay]) Nietzsche Genealogy Of Morals Essay 1 SummarySparkNotes: Genealogy of Morals: First Essay, Sections 1-9 A summary of First Essay, Sections 1-9 in Friedrich Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals.
Declaration the of genealogy Nietzsche first essay summary morals ofComplete summary of Friedrich Nietzsche's On the The publication of the first edition of this Morality: Essays on Nietzsche’s “Genealogy of Morals.
On the Genealogy of Morals: Preface and First Essay …
When he was a student in Leipzig, Nietzsche met Richard Wagner, andafter his move to Basel, he became a frequent guest in the Wagnerhousehold at Villa Tribschen in Lucerne. Nietzsche’s friendshipwith Wagner (and Cosima Liszt Wagner) lasted into the mid-1870s, andthat friendship—together with their ultimate break—werekey touchstones in his personal and professional life. His first book,The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music (1872), wasnot the careful work of classical scholarship the field might haveexpected, but a controversial polemic combining speculations about thecollapse of the tragic culture of fifth century Athens with a proposalthat Wagnerian music-drama might become the source of a renewed tragicculture for contemporary Germany. The work was generally ill receivedwithin classical studies—and savagely reviewed by UlrichWilamovitz-Möllendorff, who went on to become one of the leadingclassicists of the generation—even though it contained somestriking interpretive insights (e.g., about the role of the chorus inGreek tragedy). Following the first book, Nietzsche continued hisefforts to influence the broader direction of German intellectualculture, publishing essays intended for a wide public on DavidFriedrich Strauss, on the “use of history for life”, onSchopenhauer, and on Wagner. These essays are known collectively asthe Untimely Meditations.
Nietzsche genealogy of morals essay 1st - …
The Genealogy’s Third Treatise explores theintensification of such self-punishment via the idealization ofasceticism. Ascetic self-denial is a curious phenomenon (indeed, oncertain psychological assumptions, like descriptive psychologicalegoism or ordinary hedonism, it seems incomprehensible), but it isnevertheless strikingly widespread in the history of religiouspractice. The Genealogy misses no chance to criticizereligious versions of asceticism, but its target isbroader—including, for example, the more rational formasceticism takes in Schopenhauer’s ethics. What unifies thedifferent versions is their extension of the valorization ofself-discipline in the interest of virtue (which Nietzsche himselfwould advocate) into a thoroughgoing form of self-condemnation, inwhich self-discipline is turned against the agent herself and comes toexpress the person’s commitment to her own fundamentalworthlessness. (One obvious route to such a value system, though farfrom the only one, is for the moralist to identify a set of drives anddesires that people are bound to have—perhaps rooted in theirhuman or animal nature—and to condemn those as evil;anti-sensualist forms of asceticism follow this path.)
Nietzsche genealogy of morals essay 1st
Nietzsche was not the first to de-couple moralityfrom its divine sanction; psychological theories of the moralsentiments, developed since the eighteenth century, provided a purelyhuman account of moral normativity.
Finding the Übermensch in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality ..
The highly purified character of moralized guilt suggests how it mightbe a powerful tool for moral revaluation and simultaneously indicatessome of Nietzsche’s reasons for skepticism against it. AsWilliams (1993a) observes, a purified notion of guilt pertaining towhat is completely under the agent’s control (and so entirelyimmune from luck) stands in a particularly tight fit withblame: “Blame needs an occasion—anaction—and a target—the person who did the action and goeson to meet the blame” (Williams 1993a: 10). The pure idea ofmoralized guilt answers this need by tying any wrong actioninextricably and uniquely to a blamable agent. As we saw, the impulseto assign blame was central to the ressentiment thatmotivated the moral revaluation of values, according to the FirstTreatise. Thus, insofar as people (even nobles) become susceptible tosuch moralized guilt, they might also become vulnerable to therevaluation, and Nietzsche offers some speculations about how and whythis might happen (GM II, 16–17).