Helm identifies some emotions as person-focused emotions:emotions like pride and shame that essentially take persons as theirfocuses, for these emotions implicitly evaluate in terms of thetarget’s bearing on the quality of life of the person that istheir focus. To exhibit a pattern of such emotions focused on oneselfand subfocused on being a mother, for example, is to care about theplace being a mother has in the kind of life you find worthliving—in your identity as a person; to care in this way is tovalue being a mother as a part of your concern for your ownidentity. Likewise, to exhibit a projectible pattern of such emotionsfocused on someone else and subfocused on his being a father is tovalue this as a part of your concern for hisidentity—to value it for his sake. Such sharing ofanother’s values for his sake, which, Helm argues, essentiallyinvolves trust, respect, and affection, amounts to intimateidentification with him, and such intimate identification just islove. Thus, Helm tries to provide an account of love that is groundedin an explicit account of caring (and caring about something for thesake of someone else) that makes room for the intuitive“depth” of love through intimate identification.
By focusing on such emotionally complex histories, emotion complexviews differ from most alternative accounts of love. For alternativeaccounts tend to view love as a kind of attitude we take toward ourbeloveds, something we can analyze simply in terms of our mental stateat the moment. By ignoring this historical dimension of love in providing an accountof what love is, alternative accounts have a hard time providingeither satisfying accounts of the sense in which our identities asperson are at stake in loving another or satisfactory solutions toproblems concerning how love is to be justified (cf. , especially the discussion of ).
Though example of a definition essay about love I have no ..
In conceiving of my love for you as constituted by my concern for youfor your sake, the robust concern view rejects the idea, central tothe union view, that love is to be understood in terms of the (literalor metaphorical) creation of a “we”: this concern for youis fundamentally my concern, even if it is for your sake andso not egoistic.
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Lou was like a father to me. I have never felt so perceived and loved for who I actually am by a man than by Lou Reed. He fought tirelessly for me to have a place in the daylight culture. My career would never have taken off without Lou's tremendous influence. Those close to Lou knew him as a lion-hearted and intensely caring friend. When discussing death a couple of weeks ago, he told me that I was focussed on the wrong thing. His goal especially recently has been to exercise his mental discipline to stay in the present and not be held hostage by fear of an illusory future. He faced death with dignity and courage, and even then remained a teacher and mentor to me. i miss him with all my heart. It is hard for me to reconcile that such a giant could really be gone. Antony October 28th 2013
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The second criticism involves a substantive view concerning love. Partof what it is to love someone, these opponents say, is to have concernfor him for his sake. However, union views make such concernunintelligible and eliminate the possibility of both selfishness andself-sacrifice, for by doing away with the distinction between myinterests and your interests they have in effect turned your interestsinto mine and vice versa (Soble 1997; see also Blum 1980,1993). Some advocates of union views see this as a point in theirfavor: we need to explain how it is I can have concern for peopleother than myself, and the union view apparently does this byunderstanding your interests to be part of my own. And Delaney,responding to an apparent tension between our desire to be lovedunselfishly (for fear of otherwise being exploited) and our desire tobe loved for reasons (which presumably are attractive to our lover andhence have a kind of selfish basis), says (1996, p. 346):